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ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR THoMAS R.
PICKERING AT THE 1991 OTTO L. WALTER
DIsTINGUISHED INTERNATIONAL
FELLOW PROGRAM *
I am pleased to address the New York Law School community in
its centenary year because it gives me a chance to acknowledge the
contributions of other distinguished graduates and former faculty members,
a group that includes former President Woodrow Wilson, Supreme Court
Justices Charles Evans and John Marshall Harlan, and many others.
Your invitation to share my thoughts on the United Nations and
international law from a law school podium is appealing from a profes-
sional perspective. As United States Ambassador to the United Nations
at a time of profound global change, I am struck by the significance of
these changes for international jurisprudence.
In a very short space of time-a time still measurable in
months-the end of the Cold War has suddenly conferred upon
international law practitioners and theorists a wealth of opportunity and a
weight of responsibility rarely known in history. What is made of this
opportunity will depend upon the government's actions, the citizen's
choices, and the creativity and resourcefulness of those who study, teach,
or practice international law.
The reason the present-time is so decisive is that the ideological
chasm, which divided the world for a better part of the century, has
closed. While this chasm was open, it confined international law to
matters within the West but rarely between the East and West. This
chasm also stunted the development of law, limiting relevance to large
areas of interstate relations. The end of the Cold War makes me think of
international law as Rip Van Winkle waking from a long sleep to discover
himself the owner of a vast estate. He is initially exhilarated but then
realizes how much work must be done.
Of course, the analogy is imperfect: international law has steadily
developed through the twentieth century. Its potential domain, however,
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is now far greater than few would have suspected two or three years ago.
Similar to Rip Van Winkle's fields, many of the rules developed for
international behavior have laid dormant and might now be given
life-some other rules may be in need of improvement or revision.
This afternoon I want to explore one example from each group.
First, I will look at the Untied Nations' role in international security
because that is a long dormant area of the Charter. I will then examine
some areas of human rights and humanitarian action-an area that seems
to be close to improving or where improvements are now within reach.
I.
The end of the Cold War removed the international political
system's central and dominating principle-the East-West dispute. In a
speech delivered by President Bush, he outlined his vision of a new
ordering framework:
The New World Order does not mean surrendering our
sovereignty or forfeiting our interests. It really describes
a responsibility imposed by our successes. It refers to new
ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and
to achieve stability, to achieve prosperity and, above all,
to achieve peace. It springs from hopes for a world based
on a shared commitment to a set of principles that under-
gird our relations-peaceful settlement of disputes, solidari-
ty against oppression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and
just treatment of peoples.
What are the security implications of a transition from the Cold
War to the kind of new order the President has described? If one looks
at United States post-Cold War security interests through a United Nations
optic, one way to describe the view is to picture two adjacent circles
separated by a rather permeable border. In the first circle put the core
United Nations' security interests:
0 protection against direct attack;
0 protection of U.S. citizens abroad;
* aid and support of allies;
0 maintenance of unmolested international communication and
commerce;
0 assurance of access to vital resources;
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* insulation of essential interests from the effects of
foreign wars-such as the tanker escorts late in the
Iran-Iraq War; and so on.
In the second circle, put the broad goals, values, and principles:
0 the rule of law;
0 non-aggression and the pacific settlement of
disputes;
0 respect for sovereignty;
* defense of human rights;
* control of armaments;
9 curbs on nuclear proliferation;
0 and, in general, a disciplined, cooperative approach to
common security.
This afternoon I will explore the United Nations' role in strengthening and
enforcing these principles.
I.
The U.N. Security Council's role in the shaping and legitimizing
of the response to Iraqi aggression has raised expectations, hence political
pressures, for a comparable council role in other crises, such as those in
Haiti, Yugoslavia, and Liberia. The ratifiers of the U.N. Charter never
intended the Security Council to be the United Nations only full-time court
of first resort. Indeed, article 52 and chapter VII of the Charter explicitly
mandate regional efforts to resolve or redress threats to peace and security
before resort to the United Nations. A regional constructive engagement,
arising from shared regional, political, and cultural interests, potentially
permits a wider scope of action. The future will surely bring crises that
are not regionally containable nor totally resolvable, despite the best
efforts of regional actors. At that point, the Security Council can be
turned to as a necessary and legitimate next step. The council can also
expand on regional efforts when required; for example, internationalizing
a regional trade embargo.
With the exception of the Korean war and the Iraq-Kuwait crisis,
the subject of United Nations authorized enforcement actions is an
unwritten text. The writing of that text is not made any easier by the fact
that the threats with which we deal fit awkwardly into an imaginable
United Nations-based structure. The United Nations will not-however
strengthened-easily embrace the potentially wide security missions of the
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future. Therefore, we should look to the United Nations to deliver only
a part of the solution. The scope of the United Nations' role may depend
on its ability to develop two key elements of any new approach to
security: legitimacy and flexibility.
As a starting point, we need to understand what constitutes
"legitimacy" for intervention by force. For the United States and its
allies, Resolution 678, which authorized "all necessary means" to secure
Iraq's immediate and unc6nditional withdrawal from Kuwait, was close to
an ideal formulation. The Resolution granted United Nations authority for
the use of force without undue restriction on the manner, extent, or terms
for its cessation-both important military and political considerations for
the successful conduct of operations. It was understood that the coalition
would strive to achieve withdrawal from Kuwait by observing certain
norms and restraints. Full observation of the rules of war and employ-
ment of conventional weapons were the implicit parts of the authority
granted to the coalition by the Resolution.
Not surprisingly, the open-ended character of these arrangements
gave discomfort to many other United Nations members. The Security-
General has commented that while the war against Iraq was made
legitimate by the Security Council, it was not a United Nations victory
since that could have resulted only from hostilities controlled and directed
by the United Nations. One need not share Security General de Cuellar's
view to appreciate his point that the most iron-clad legal justification may
not buy us that more evanescent political commodity: legitimacy.
Although the allied actions in Iraq shared near universal interna-
tional support, the licensing of a few countries to use force in the council's
name enables detractors to argue that the action is the project of a few
governments thereby unrepresentative of the world community. For
military actions comparable in scale to Operation Desert Storm, any
significant degree of United States direction and control over combat
operations could have imposed serious constraints. Council cohesion,
however, which was nurtured by the Iraq experience, may extend to other
issues. If this proves true, there may be pressure for enhancing the
Security Council's role in future peace enforcement.
One way the Charter may maintain peace is by the application of
article 43. Paragraph 1 of article 43 requests member states to
[ulndertake to make available to the Security Council, on
its call, and in accordance with a special agreement or
agreements, armed forces assistance and facilities, includ-
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ing rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of main-
taining peace and security. 1
A vital question about article 43 is what kind of command arrangements
it implies. In my view, article 43 agreements are compatible with their
signatories' exercise of wide military latitude when those agreements are
invoked. In this sense, the agreement might be less a format for direct
council control than an expression of its general capacity to enforce
decisions and hence a means of deterrence.
Delegated enforcement is explicitly anticipated in the U.N.
Charter, most relevantly in articles 48 and 53. Article 48 empowers the
council to determine which members shall conduct the action required to
carry out its decisions "for the maintenance of international peace and
security." 2 Article 53 permits the council to utilize "regional arrange-
ments or agencies for enforcement action under its authority."'
Notwithstanding the legality of delegated enforcement, the council
may now play a more active role in command and control. Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter, particularly articles 42, 46, and 47, provides
vehicles for direct council involvement in the command and control
functions. Any move in this direction, however, will raise concerns
among troop contributors. For example, Chapter VII's emphasis on the
role of the Military Staff Committee is especially problematic: no state
whose troops are engaged in hostilities is likely to allow a group to which
it does not belong direct or control its troops, especially if that group's
members have not also contributed troops.
There may be ways of partially employing articles 42 and 47 while
inoculating them against their most intrusive potential; these may be worth
exploring particularly in the context of small-scale or low-intensity
conflict. We may also wish to explore arrangements whereby peace
enforcers could report regularly to the council itself or a sub-group of the
council. This type of consultative link could be a helpful tool for
preserving consensus, while not altering command relationships.
One of the questions our security community will need to consider
is how command and operational interaction of the forces might be
employed to give effect to a Security Council decision. The development
of this policy requires a balancing between the need to avoid over-
identification of a few countries and the exigencies of the unity of
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1.
2. Id. art. 48.
3. Id. art. 53.
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command, rapid deployment, coordinated movements, and so on. In the
future, if the United Nations authorized uses of force require more
integrated combat operations than were typical of Operation Desert Storm,
we need good answers to many unanalyzed military and political questions
about non-NATO coalition warfare.
You may be interested to know that in 1946 and 1947 the
permanent members of the Security Council held lengthy negotiations to
produce a model article 43 agreement, that is, an agreement by which a
member state would supply forces to the United Nations. I recently had
the opportunity to read a review of these discussions prepared by David
Scheffer of the Carnegie Endowment. Let me cite a few of his findings
for you:
Force Strength
The overall strength of the United Nations' force would be small;
its moral weight and potential would be great. It would be limited in size
to enable it to take prompt action. The Security Council could change the
overall strength of the force by entering into additional special agreements
with member states.
Contributing Countries
The Permanent Five initially would contribute the major portion
of the troops. The United States, France, Britain, and China (the
Nationalist government) agreed that contributions would be comparable to
each nation's capabilities. The Soviet Union insisted on equality of
contributions.
Contributions Other than Forces
Contributions by members may not necessarily be represented by
armed forces. Members could fulfill their obligations by furnishing
"assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage."'
Decision to Deploy
Armed forces would be deployed only on the decision of the
Security Council and only for the period necessary to fulfill tasks
4. Id. art. 43(1).
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envisaged by article 42. The United Nation force should be deployed in
time to forestall or to suppress a breach of the peace or act of aggression.
Decision to Withdraw
The United States, France, Britain, and China agreed that the
United Nations' force would be withdrawn as quickly as possible and that
a deadline would be established by the Security Council. The Soviet
Union believed, however, that the United Nations' force must be with-
drawn within thirty to ninety days after the article 42 measures are
fulfilled, unless the Security Council decides otherwise. The Soviets also
argued that the forces must be withdrawn from "rights of passage"
territories within thirty days.
Readiness
The degree of readiness of the national contingents would be
established in the respective special agreements. The contingents must be
able to start action "in good time."
Forces Location
The permanent members, except the Soviet Union, agreed on a
wide distribution of forces throughout the world so that the Security
Council could take prompt action in any part of the world. They also
agreed that the Security Council should be notified before the displacement
of these forces.
Command and Control
The Permanent Five agreed that the designated national contingents
would remain under the control of the member governments until the
Security Council activated them for United Nations service. It was
insistent that the "control" be exercised by the Security Council, not the
Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee would be
responsible for the "strategic direction" of the United Nations' force. The
actual command of the national contingents, however, would be exercised
by commanders appointed by the respective member governments. The
national contingents would retain their national character and would be
subject to the discipline and regulations in their national armed forces.
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Overall Command
China, the Soviet Union, and the United States agreed that there
should be an overall commander appointed by the Security Council on the
advice of the Military Staff Committee to coordinate decision making.
France and Britain argued, however, for the appointment of a supreme
commander who would have the power to control all United Nations'
forces.
'Il.
These remarks have primarily concerned United Nations action in
cases of already open conflict, but another very important area of
increased United Nations activity is conflict avoidance. In the
communique of the London Summit this summer, the G7 leaders
committed themselves to securing the basis for United Nations preventive
diplomacy. To fulfill this goal the institution will need to shift to a higher
gear. The following are some useful steps to further a preventative
diplomacy policy:
0 informal information sharing among member states,
so that the Secretary-General remains fully informed of
existing or potential situations that could lead to interna-
tional friction (this is now occurring within the context of
Resolution 687's Iraqi WMD inspection program);
0 requiring disputants or potential disputants to keep
the Secretary-General fully informed of all pertinent facts;
0 supporting the enhanced use of special representa-
tives in good offices and quiet diplomacy missions to help
resolve issues that may lead to conflict;
0 making use of individual states or small groups of
states to assist with the diplomacy of dispute resolution;
0 finally, making use of United Nations' forces as a
means of forestalling conflict before hostilities occur by




Regarding peace-keeping, the United Nations is in a major growth
phase. The United Nations has undertaken more missions in the last three
years than in its first forty-three.
The scope and variety of functions has grown as well. It is time
to strengthen the organizational structure of United Nations' peace-keeping
planning and management in order to keep up with the heavy workload.
It is also time to organize long-term peacekeeping financing. Within the
United States, it might be worthwhile to consider creating a substantial
peace-keeping account in the Department of Defense budget.
V.
One phenomenon apparent to even a casual observer of the world
today is the increasingly local character of conflict. In fact, probably most
conflicts today are conflicts within states, not between them. In the post-
Desert Storm period, it is therefore worthwhile to remind ourselves that
threats to regional stability after the Cold War largely and essentially are
shaped by parochial concerns of an ethnic, religious political, economic,
and social character.
A daily dilemma facing the Security Council is that while the rule
of law and the role of order are more comfortably complementary after the
Cold War, they are not equivalent. International law has little positive to
say about the responsibilities of other states in the event of coups and
anarchy or bloodshed within a neighbor's borders. In fact the rule of law
would permit, though it is unpleasant to ponder, a state convulsed by
extraordinarily destructive, but utterly legal, internal conflict. Lebanon,
through most of the 1970s and 1980s, and Yugoslavia today, are sobering
reminders of this reality.
This dilemma is not helped by the fact that the common law of
states and the covenants and treaties agreed among them permit competing
and conflicting claims. This is nowhere more evident than when the
international community is forced to choose between the rights of states
and the rights of peoples.
Our continuing experience with Iraq illustrates the tension. When,
in November, 1990, the Security Council adopted Resolution 678 authoriz-
ing action to expel Iraq from Kuwait, the Resolution's legal basis was the
U.N. Charter prohibition in article 2, paragraph 4 on the threat or use of
force against another state. When persecuted Iraqi Kurds fled into Turkey
and Iran five months later, the Security Council majority made a very
different finding. It reasoned, in Resolution 688, that the massive flight
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of the Kurds presented a threat to international peace and security
sufficient to override the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of
another state, a principle protected by another provision (paragraph 7) of
the same article.
For those who may not be familiar with Resolution 688 it is worth
reviewing its major terms.
* First, it found that the repression of the Kurdish
civilian population constituted a threat to peace and
security in the region and pointedly reminded Iraq of the
Security Council's responsibility for the maintenance of
peace and security.
0 Second, it demanded that Iraq immediately end
such repression.
0 Third, it insisted that Iraq permit immediate access
by international humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to address
the needs of refugees and displaced persons.
0 Fourth, it requested the Secretary-General to pursue
his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to address the needs of
refugees and displaced persons.
0 Fifth, it appealed to all member states and all
humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humani-
tarian efforts.
0 Lastly, it demanded Iraqi cooperation with these
ends.
Although the terms reflect Iraq's unique position as a country
subject to the enforcement provision of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
they also reveal a new willingness to act in the face of massive
humanitarian provocation.
The writ for international humanitarian action, either stated or
implied in these provision, was extraordinary and unprecedented. The
United Nations and Iraq drew up a Memorandum of Understanding, which
provided for the current widespread presence of most relief personnel in
the country today. The passage of this resolution and Iraq's status as a
country subject to mandatory enforcement actions under Chapter VII
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opened a legal space for the coalition to provide relief and support for the
Kurds.
Notwithstanding the humanitarian issue, Resolution 688 was very
difficult to negotiate. More recently, stiff resistance to forceful resolutions
has begun in Haiti and Yugoslavia. This leads me to two conclusions:
0 First, work must be done before the Security
Council is ready to serve regularly as a global crisis
manager; this would require a clear and predictable
consensus on how and to what extent it should address
threats to international security arising from internal
situations within states. Unfortunately, no such consensus
yet exists.
0 Second, as a consequence we must remain open as
the U.N. Charter provides to alternative regional and even
unilateral tools to serve the "order" as well as the "law
and justice" agendas.
In a sense this way of thinking about security leads us back to first
principles. Part of the "work" ahead for the international community is
the toilsome task of nurturing an international society of common values
to inform and vitalize the orderly world. Civil order in the United States
benefits from the absorptive power of shared values and a common
culture, that dulls many of our differences and lessens rivalries.
The absence of an international parallel culture, although tolerable
during the Cold War, is now a source of frustration. While the collapse
of communism has eliminated the major global clash of values, it has had
an opposite effect on nationalist, tribal, religious, economic, and ethnic
conflicts that threaten to reenergize North-South economic discord.
Due to the lack of an international community, we are unlikely to
see the rapid elaboration of international law to provide external
guarantees for minority rights, democratically elected governments, or
hungry people caught in a civil war. A significant number of United
Nations members do not see such values as leading to order, but
subversive of it, or at least subversive of an order based on firm doctrines
of state sovereignty and non-intervention. I believe that often the reason
is not a Third World antipathy to such principles, but instead a suspicion
that a Trojan Horse of western involvement by United Nations member-
states may interfere.
Such reservations do not mean that we must give up hope for
stronger protections for human rights or humanitarian concerns. On the
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contrary, a combination of pragmatism and vision is required to develop
a rapidly evolving global security system. The accomplishment of this aim
should be achieved through the use of established United Nations organs;
however, if this avenue is blocked, a pragmatic approach means reaching
outside the United Nations though still within the U.N. Charter, to employ
other forums or tools. Finally, we need to have the vision to see, and the
will to use, new opportunities to fill the gap between the heavy demands
of a just and orderly world and the modest means of current international
law.
As a first step, leaders of developed industrial democracies should
realize that they are not the only people who recognize that a just world
requires respect for human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms, and
international humanitarian responsibility.
For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
is at the center of the global human rights movement, has universal
cultural roots. Although its creation was lead by Eleanor Roosevelt, the
drafters included a Uruguayan, Chilean, Panamanian, Chinese vice
chairman, and Lebanese rapporteur. Of course, the American Bill of
Rights, the French Rights of Man, and the English Magna Carta are well
known influences. Some far less recognized influences to the
Declaration's international stature are the Declaration's non-western
influences, including Chinese ethics and Hindu philosophy. Although
Egypt was the only African nation involved in the initial promulgation,
because most African nations' trustee or colonial status prevented it, a
remarkable number of African constitutions today affirm adherence to the
Declaration's principles.
I am also happy to report that respect for democracy is not unique
to the industrial democracies. For example, in a meeting in Santiago,
Chile last winter, the Organization of American States ("OAS") adopted
a legal instrument authorizing strong action, including the use of
diplomatic and economic sanctions, to reverse coups against
democratically-elected governments. The United Nations, of course, lacks
a comparable instrument, but surprisingly, so do the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe's Paris Charter ("CSCE"), the
European Community's Rome Treaty, the Western European Union's
Charter, and even NATO. In fact, the OAS and General Assembly
resolutions on Haiti have provided the impetus for the embargo and the
wide international campaign to restore the legitimate, democratically
elected government.
The supposedly axiomatic nature of third world feeling toward
non-intervention often varies from country to country, as attested by wide-
spread Arab support for Resolution 687 and current United Nations'
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efforts to ensure Iraq's nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the most dramatic
indictment of the doctrine did not come from one of Saddam Hussein's
victims or neighbors, but from Godfrey Binaisa, successor to Idi Amin.
Reproaching the members of the General Assembly on September 29,
1979, Binaisa said:
In light of the clear commitment set out in the Charter, our
people naturally looked to the United Nations for solidarity
and support in their struggle. For eight years they cried
out in the wilderness for help; unfortunately their cries
seemed to have fallen on deaf ears [as the Amin regime]
continued with impunity to commit genocide against our
people.
Somehow it is thought to be bad taste or contrary
to diplomatic etiquette to raise matters of violations of
human rights by member states within the forums of the
United Nations.
I must add the following examples to those just cited: the roots of
the Universal Declaration, the Organization of American States Santiago
Declaration, the reproach of President Binaisa, and the remarkable salute
that personal freedom and democracy received from developing countries
in speech after speech in this year's General Debate. In many parts of the
world, actions support such rhetoric. The positions foster the United
Nations more aggressive pursuit of policies and processes affording greater
protection for human rights and humanitarian principles. Let me close by
offering a few examples of what I have in mind:
0 In recent years, the official and private relief
community has developed a number of principles on
humanitarian access whose observation by host countries
directly affects the lives of afflicted groups. These include
such things as right of access, respect for relief corridors,
permission for cross-border operations, and so on. While
some General Assembly resolutions have supported such
ideas on occasion, it would be useful to examine whether
they could be given a stronger normative form.
0 In the area of fundamental freedoms, U.S. ratifica-
tion of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights would be
important internationally. Given the very large number of
signatories to the Covenant and the relevance of its
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democratic and pluralistic protections to so many countries
now convulsed by internal change, early Senate consent
would greatly enhance its standing.
0 Similarly, Congressional consent of the Convention
against Torture is expected shortly. Ratification of the
Convention will also strengthen its international force.
0 There are also new possibilities for improving
human rights monitoring. In this regard, a worthy model
for the United Nations to emulate is the Human Dimension
Mechanism, the remarkable recent achievement for the
European Conference on Security and Cooperation. The
CSCE mechanism sets out a sequence of steps by which
CSCE members can call a fellow member to account for
apparent violations.
* At the U.N. Human Rights Commission, two ways
to improve monitoring would be the expansion and
strengthening of the country raporteur system and the
streamlining of the Commission's now lengthy and com-
plex mechanism for examining accumulated individual
complaints.
0 The Commission could also improve its ability to
give prompt attention to egregious abuses by simply giving
itself the capacity for emergency inter-sessional meetings
to consider especially important and urgent problems.
0 A policy not yet adopted, but worth exploring, is
the possibility of applying sanctions to massive human
rights violators.
VII.
I want to end my formal remarks here and leave a generous
amount of time for your questions. Before I do, however, I hope you will
forgive me for closing these thoughts with a baseball metaphor, one
brought to mind by the frustrating career of the Minnesota Twins,
storybook winners of this year's World Series.
For a moment, think of history as one long ball game. There are
two clubs. One team bats for the rule of law, and the other for the law
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of the jungle. After more losing seasons than anyone can remember, the
rule of law guys are on a streak. The hardcore faithful fans are patting
themselves on the back, and even wise guy cynics are coming to the park.
Everyone is amazed and hopeful.
In a sense that is the state of international law. After a forty-five
year run, the Cold War is over. Many of the suppressed norms and
practices of international law can now be made to work.
If this remarkable turn toward global cooperation is to remain, we
will need to refine old concepts, add new ones, and extend their frontiers.
Thank you.

